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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. The District Court Erred in Denying the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
That the Defense Team’s Performance Was Deficient Because it Failed to Move to Suppress
Evidence Found on a Computer Seized Outside the Authority of the Warrant.
The state first incorporates “the district court’s analysis and decision” on this issue.
State’s Brief, pg. 20. Torey has already set forth why that decision is in error in the Opening
Brief and no reply is required.
The state next argues that the search warrant “shows an obvious scrivener’s error.” Id.
But, even if true, that observation is meaningless because the Fourth Amendment requires that a
search warrant specifically list the items which may be seized: “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized.” (Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)
“The fact that the application adequately described the ‘things to be seized’ does not save the
warrant from its facial invalidity. The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in
the warrant, not in the supporting documents” unless those documents are properly incorporated
by the warrant itself. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004). See, State v. Bussard, 114
Idaho 781, 787, 760 P.2d 1197, 1203 (Ct. App. 1988) (“when a search exceeds the scope
permitted by a valid (or partially valid) search warrant . . . the property unlawfully seized will be
suppressed”); State v. Weimer, 133 Idaho 442, 448-49, 988 P.2d 216, 222-23 (Ct. App. 1999)
(where Court looks at words of warrant to determine whether it authorized the seizure of items
taken during a search); State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 707 P.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1985) (Seizure
of calculator which was not listed as item to be seized on search warrant found to be outside
scope of warrant). See also, State v. Plowman, 602 P.2d 286, 288 (Ore. App. 1979) (rejecting
1

invitation to “carve a ‘scrivener’s omission’ exception” into statutory particularity requirement).
The state’s reliance on United States v. 500 Delaware St., 949 F. Supp. 166, 171 (W.D.N.Y.
1996), is misplaced. That case is inconsistent with Supreme Court and Idaho case law.
In light of the above, trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to move to
suppress the evidence under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984).1 As explained
below, Torey suffered Strickland prejudice.
With regard to prejudice, the state argues that Torey and his character witnesses “would
have been impeached . . . with the many comments by [him] that were recorded on the Black
Rock Canyon videotape.” State’s Brief, pg. 23. Of course, the state had an opportunity to do so
at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing but failed to do so. So its bare assertion of what
“would have been” rings hollow in light of what the record actually shows. If it could have
impeached the character witnesses or Torey it should have done so. The fact it didn’t even try
shows it couldn’t. Further, the Black Rock video was admitted at the trial. Thus, the character
evidence about Torey’s kind, gentle and generous behavior during the rest of his life could only
have helped the defense case by diminishing the effect of the video. Indeed, that was the purpose
of the character witnesses: to inform the jury that there was much more to Torey Adamcik than
what was portrayed in the video. As defense counsel explained, “I think there was an
overwhelming amount of evidence that was all negative in nature and we wanted to take some
1

While the post-conviction court stated that it found the evidence relating to “violence
and slasher/horror movies” to be more prejudicial than the explicit images, State’s Brief, pg. 16
n. 5, that was not the concern of the defense team at the trial. The prosecuting attorney informed
defense counsel that it would introduce evidence of the “kiddie porn” if the defense put on its
planned character witnesses. PCT pg. 96, ln. 4 - pg. 97, ln. 1. No mention was made of the other
items. In any case, the motion to suppress would have applied to all the evidence found on the
computer.
2

steps to counteract that. We wanted to present and show that he definitely had good qualities.”
PCT pg. 94, ln. 7-12.
In addition to decreasing the prejudicial effect of the video – the most compelling piece of
state’s evidence – there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have then believed Torey’s
testimony that he did not stab Cassie, that he left the house, and Brian Draper then completed the
murder. The jury would have believed Torey’s testimony because it was corroborated by the
testimony of Dr. Leis and Mr. Reit that only one knife was used. And, of course, Brian could
have used both of the knives as Torey left the Sloan knife behind. PCP T pg. 348, ln. 2-3.2
Torey’s testimony that he didn’t stab Cassie was confirmed by Brian Draper’s videotaped
confession that he was the murderer: “I stabbed her in the throat, and I saw her lifeless body. It
just disappeared. Dude, I just killed Cassie!” State’s Trial Exhibit 89 (transcript) (emphasis
added). Brian’s confession to being the killer is undoubtedly true. All the physical evidence is
consistent with Brian, not Torey, doing the stabbing. The evidence regarding the knives, the
DNA evidence, and the blood evidence all was consistent with the theory.3

2

The state admitted during closing argument that it could not put a particular knife into
Torey’s hand: “Which knife did Brian Draper use? Which knife did Torey Adamcik use? We
don't know[.]” T pg. 2811, ln. 20-24. Brian, of course, could have used both knives.
3

Torey’s mask did not have any of Cassie’s DNA on it, while Brian’s mask had Cassie’s
blood on it. T pg. 1668, ln. 4 - pg. 1669, ln. 1. Cassie’s blood was also on Brian’s shirt. T pg.
1167, ln. 14-20. A soccer glove also had Cassie's blood on it. Brian played soccer at the high
school. The DNA found in the glove was not Torey’s but could be Brian’s. T pg. 2680, ln. 22 pg. 2681, ln. 4. There were no fingerprints, fibers, blood or other sources of DNA which
matched Torey. None of Torey’s clothing or personal items had any of Cassie’s DNA on them.
T pg. 1667, ln. 1 - pg. 1670, ln. 11. While there was some DNA found in the fingernail clippings
from Cassie, Torey was excluded as a contributor. T pg. 2674, ln. 14 - pg. 2675, ln. 21.
3

The state’s assertion that Torey’s testimony “does nothing to show that . . . the result of
trial would have been different,” State’s Brief, pg. 25, is mistaken. First, it is legally mistaken
because Torey only needs to show a reasonable probability of a different result, not that he would
have been acquitted. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 694. Second, it is factually erroneous because the
video, even taken literally, does not show that Torey committed the murder; it shows a
conspiracy to do so and some attempts to cover up the murder that Brian expressly and
repeatedly confessed to committing. Third, the jury did not hear evidence of Torey’s good
character and it did not hear Torey’s testimony that he ran out of the Stoddard house when he
realized what Brian had done. If the jury had heard all the defense evidence, there is a reasonable
probability it would have only convicted Torey on the conspiracy charge, at worst.4
B. The District Court Erred in Finding Torey Was Not Prejudiced by the Deficient
Performance of the Defense Team Which Failed to Get Important Expert Testimony Before
the Jury.
The state argues that part of the prejudice caused by defense counsel’s deficient
performance is not Strickland prejudice because “the prosecutor’s and trial judge’s comments to
Adamcik’s trial team during the failed attempt to present Mr. Reit as an expert witness . . . bear
little, if any, causal relationship to the actual deficient performance of his counsel alleged in the
post-conviction petition and found by the district court – the failure to obtain the two knives for
testing.” State’s Brief, pg. 27-28. That argument is dead wrong. The only reason the trial court
and prosecutor made those comments was because the defense failed to obtain the knives for

4

Recall that the court’s instructions required the jury to find “the defendant Torey
Adamcik killed Cassie Stoddard.” CR V, pg. 935. No accomplice liability instruction was
given. Torey would have been acquitted of the murder charge even if the jury found he was an
accomplice.
4

testing. In fact, there is a “but for” relationship between the deficient performance and that aspect
of the Strickland prejudice. If the two knives had been tested, the evidence would have been
admissible and admitted without objection. The jury would never have heard the judge berate
and hector the defense team for its incompetence and it never would have heard the prosecutor
angrily call the defense team liars. Thus, the prejudice was proximately caused by the deficiency.
The court’s instruction that it would not intend to “indicate any opinion concerning the
evidence” in the case, R Vol. V, pg. 1087, did not cure the prejudice. First, it did not even apply
to Mr. Reit’s proffered testimony, which was not admitted. Further, it still permitted the jury to
consider the judge’s comments about the competency of the defense attorneys. And while the
jury was instructed that in determining the facts it may consider only the evidence admitted at
trial, id., there is no doubt that the jury’s evaluation of the evidence presented was colored by its
conclusion about which team of lawyers was competent and honest. When the jury drew
conclusions about contested facts, it was more likely to conclude the state’s evidence was reliable
and trustworthy because the members of the defense team were bumblers and liars. Thus, the
jury would have followed the court’s instruction that it base its decision of the evidence while at
the same time be influenced by the behavior of the Judge and prosecutors. The prejudice results
because the jury was less likely to believe the defense evidence than the state’s evidence. The
prejudicial comments were not evidence but they undermined the jury’s confidence in the
defense team and influenced the jury to believe the state’s evidence rather than the defense
evidence.
Next the state argues that Mr. Reit’s testimony would not have corroborated Dr. Leis’s
testimony that only one knife was used. In doing so, the state comes up with a new argument:
5

that Dr. Leis’s testimony was self-contradictory, i.e., that his testimony that the knife that caused
wound #1 went into Cassie’s chest to the hilt and showed no sign of serrations contradicted his
later testimony that wound #1 was caused by a serrated knife. State’s Brief, pg. 33. This
argument could not have rebutted Mr. Reit’s testimony because it was never made at the trial.
The state, in closing argument, did not talk about Dr. Leis’s testimony. Instead, it admitted it
could not prove which knife was used by which defendant, but went on to suggest that Torey
likely used the serrated blade. It noted that Torey listed a “survival knife” in his notebook
(State’s Exhibit 84), while the sheath for the Sloan knife was found at Brian’s home. T Vol 3,
pg. 2812, ln. 12 - pg. 2813, ln. 8.5 In rebuttal argument, the state conceded that “Dr. Leis is a
credible witness.” T Vol 3, pg. 2860, ln. 1. It then repeated Dr. Garrison’s observation that there
was a hilt mark on wound #1 but no serrations, T Vol 3, pg. 2860, ln. 15-10, without discussing
Dr. Leis’s explanation for the absence of serrations on wound #1.6 In light of that, the state’s
new theory regarding wound #1 would not have diminished the impact of Mr. Reit’s testimony at
the criminal trial because the state never argued it to the jury.7 Consequently, Mr. Reit’s
testimony, had it been presented, would have had its desired effect: to corroborate Dr. Leis’s

5

To the contrary, Joe Locero testified that Brian Draper possessed and claimed
ownership of the Rambo knife, saying that “I paid for that knife – I get to keep it.” T pg. 2022,
ln. 7 - pg. 2023, ln. 18; T pg. 2026, ln. 14-21.
6

Wound #15 was also caused by a smooth-edged blade, like the Sloan knife, but was not
a potentially fatal wound. T pg. 2220, ln. 6 - pg. 2222, ln. 21. As instructed, the jury could not
have convicted Torey of killing Cassie Stoddard even if the jury found he inflicted this wound.
7

The state summarized the evidence about wound #1 thus: “So it’s a baffling case to
experts to decide how many knives were used, but the important thing is there are two wounds,
"15" and "1," where it appears that the knife went up to the hilt. There is a hilt mark on one, and
there is no serrations.” T pg. 2860 15-23.
6

testimony and tip the balance in his favor in the battle of the experts.
Second, the state’s theory is speculative and was untested at either the trial or at the
evidentiary hearing. It is telling that the state did not recall Dr. Garrison at the trial in order to
rebut Dr. Leis’s testimony.
Finally, the state’s argument does not make sense. Dr. Leis testified the absence of the
serration marks is explained by the presence of such marks on Cassie’s hand, i.e., that the “knife
went through her hand and into her chest,” leaving serration marks on the hand. T 2651, 4-7.
The fact that there is a hilt mark on one side of the wound does not mean both sides of the blade
completely entered the chest, as assumed by the state. The other hilt mark is on the hand, instead
of the chest. Tr. Vol. III, pg. 2613, ln.2 - pg. 2615, ln. 10 (Referring to photographs #12-13 in
Defense Trial Exhibit DD).
Torey was prejudiced in two ways by counsel’s failure to obtain the knives for testing.
First, the failure undermined the credibility of the defense team in the eyes of the jury and
colored its evaluation of the defense evidence. Second, it resulted in important defense evidence
being withheld from the jury. Torey has demonstrated both deficient performance and prejudice
under Strickland v. Washington, supra. The post-conviction court erred in denying this claim.
C. The District Court Erred in Finding That Torey Was Not Prejudiced by the
Cumulative Effect of the Defense Team’s Deficient Performance.
The state asserts that Torey has not shown the cumulative effect of the deficient
performance was prejudicial under Strickland. It does not make any further argument in support
of that assertion and therefore no reply is needed.

7

D. The Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing the Eighth Amendment Claim.
The state devotes a scant three paragraphs to this issue, the first merely incorporating “the
district court’s decisions that are relevant on this issue.” State’s Brief, pg. 36. Torey, however,
has already explained in detail why the district court’s decisions were incorrect. Opening Brief
pg. 27-41. Mere incorparation of the district court’s decisions does not address Torey’s specific
arguments and no reply is needed.
Next, the state claims that the district court’s decisions are consistent with Johnson v.
State, — Idaho —, — P.3d —, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 131, 2017 WL 1967808 (May 12, 2017).
Johnson “explained that ‘Miller and Montgomery [. . .] require that the sentencing court weighs
the juvenile offender’s youth and characteristics against the nature of the crime to determine
whether the crime was one that ‘reflected the transient immaturity’ of youth.” State’s Brief, pg.
37. The state, however, ignores the fact that – unlike in Johnson – the sentencing court didn’t do
what Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, —
U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), require.
1. Johnson is distinguishable because the sentencer here did not comply with the
procedural requirements of Miller.
As set forth in the Opening Brief, the sentencing court did not consider the “distinctive
attributes of youth,” as required by Miller. To the contrary, it frankly admitted it was not going
to impose a term sentence, even though it recognized Torey was young, because of the nature of
the offense. T (8/24/2007) pg. 59, ln 17 (“There’s no mercy.”). And, while that was permissible
under Idaho law before Miller, that is now prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

8

Miller “did more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before
imposing life without parole; it established that the penological justifications for life without
parole collapse in light of “the distinctive attributes of youth.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct., at 734 quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct., at 2465. While the sentencer generally acknowledged
Torey’s youth, it failed to properly consider the constitutional implications of that fact. Under
Miller, the sentencing court must start from the premise that “children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” 132 S. Ct., at 2464. The sentencing court did
not start from this premise. To the contrary, it questioned the very premise of Miller when it
mused that, “Teenaged killers perhaps should receive no mercy. I don’t know.” T (8/24/2007)
pg. 56, ln. 24-25.
Under Miller, the sentencing court must both recognize and give mitigating effect to these
differences. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, they
are less deserving of the most severe punishments. Miller, 567 U.S., at 471. Here, the
sentencing court did not consider Torey’s diminished culpability and greater prospects for
reform. It did not consider Torey’s “‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” It did not consider
that Torey was “more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from
peers (in this case Brian Draper, the ringleader). The sentencing court did not consider that
Torey’s youth caused him to “lack the ability to extricate [himself] from horrific,
crime-producing settings.” And the sentencing court did not consider that Torey’s character is
not as “well formed” as an adult’s; thus his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be

9

“evidence of irretrievable depravity.” All these considerations are now required by Miller. 132 S.
Ct., at 2464.
While Miller recognized that “the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological
justifications” for imposing life without parole on juvenile offenders, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465, the
sentencing court did not. In particular, the sentencing court selected the JLWOP sentence in
order to inflict the maximum amount of punishment, stating that “in our society, at least in my
opinion, when someone engages in this type of conduct, they should be punished as severe as the
law allows. There is no justification, no excuse, that condones this type of conduct . . .the
sentence this Court imposed was a righteous sentence given the conduct, and I don’t believe Mr.
Adamcik should be ever released from prison.” T Vol. VI, pg. 3110, ln. 25 - pg. 3111, ln. 11.
This directly contravenes Miller which instructs that “the case for retribution is not as strong with
a minor as with an adult,” Ibid.
While Miller holds that “the deterrence rationale likewise does not suffice, since “the
same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults—their immaturity,
recklessness, and impetuosity—make them less likely to consider potential punishment” 132 S.
Ct., at 2465, the sentencing court said the fixed life sentence had to be imposed for deterrence. It
said when “you commit a crime of this nature . . . it’s got to be known, not only by those who
commit it, but to others in the community that the punishment will not – will not be so merciful.
There’s no mercy.” T (8/24/2007) pg. 59, ln. 13-17. Again, the sentencing court did the opposite
of what Miller requires.
Further, the sentencing court said it was basing the sentence in part on Torey’s perceived
future dangerous. This is contrary to Miller’s instruction that “the need for incapacitation is
10

lessened . . . because ordinary adolescent development diminishes the likelihood that a juvenile
offender “forever will be a danger to society.” 132 S. Ct., at 2465, quoting Graham, 560 U.S., at
72. (As previously argued, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that
Torey would be a future danger. To the contrary, all the psychological evidence presented
showed he had great potential for rehabilitation. Tr pg. 2910, ln. 15 - pg. 2911, ln. 5.)
In sum, “Miller requires that before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole, the
sentencing judge take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct., at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). Here, however, the sentencing
court acknowledged Torey’s youth but did not take into account how Torey was different from an
adult offender because of his youth. Nor did it consider how Torey’s youth counseled against
imposing the fixed life sentence. Thus, unlike Johnson, the substantive requirements of
Miller/Montgomery that the sentencing court consider the distinctive attributes of youth and how
those “differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. at 480.
Since the state’s brief was filed, this Court has issued Windom v. State, — Idaho —, —
P.3d —, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 208 (June 10, 2017). The Court wrote that “[a]lthough the district
court stated that it considered Windom’s ‘relative youth’ as a mitigating factor, ‘Miller . . . did
more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life
without parole; it established that the penological justifications for life without parole collapse in
light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’” Windom v. State, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 208, *18-19;

11

quoting Miller, 136 S.Ct. at 734.8 The Court distinguished Windom from Johnson, noting that
“[i]n Johnson, we upheld a juvenile’s pre-Miller sentence of life without parole for the murder of
her parents because evidence later required by Miller had been admitted during the sentencing
hearing and considered by the trial court before it imposed a sentence of fixed life.” Windom v.
State, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 208, *21 (emphasis added). In Johnson, “the trial court spent
considerable time discussing the reasons why it was imposing life without parole and explicitly
noted that it had heard and considered the evidence presented on Johnson’s youth. The trial
court’s sentencing colloquy was approximately forty-four pages and makes specific reference to
having considered the testimony about Johnson's youth.” Johnson v. State, — Idaho — , —
P.3d —, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 131, 2017 WL 1967808 (May 12, 2017). Here, as shown above, the
sentencing court relied upon reasons – retribution, deterrence and future dangerousness – that the
Miller court specifically says should not be given great weight when imposing a fixed life
sentence upon a juvenile. Thus, the sentencing court did not consider the distinctive qualities of
youth as required by Miller. Moreover, unlike the 44 page sentencing colloquy in Johnson, here
the sentencing court took barely seven pages to sentence both Torey and Brian Draper. And,
after noting “the frontal lobe of [Torey’s] brain not being fully developed due to [his] age,” the

8

Thus, when the Court said in State v. Fisher, — Idaho —, — P.3d —, 2017 Ida. LEXIS
232, *12 (July 17, 2017) that “[t]he considerations of societal retribution and general
deterrence are not decided on the basis of the unique characteristics of the offender; rather these
considerations are decided upon the characteristics of the offense,” Id, citing State v. Windom,
150 Idaho 873, 880, 253 P.3d 310, 317 (2011), that statement is limited to cases where an adult is
being sentenced. State v. Windom is not apposite to juvenile fixed life cases, even though Mr.
Windom was a juvenile, because Miller/Montgomery had not been decided in 2011, and Mr.
Windom did not raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence. The more recent case of
Windom v. State, supra, establishes that Miller/Montgomery now apply to the JLWOP sentence
in that case.
12

court only makes Windom-like generic comments about Torey’s youth, e.g. “That’s what you are,
you’re kids.” T (8/24/2007) pg. 53, ln. 22 - pg. 59, ln. 24 (“you’re kids” and “you guys are
kids”). In that respect, this case is more like Windom than Johnson and relief should be granted.
2. Johnson is also distinguishable because Torey has made a prima facie claim of a
substantive Eighth Amendment violation in his pleadings.
Even if the procedure outlined in Miller is followed, “Miller . . . does not leave States free
to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without parole. To the
contrary, Miller established that this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth
Amendment.” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct., at 735. Thus this Court’s opinion in Johnson does not
resolve Torey’s case for another reason. Johnson only addresses the argument that the
sentencing hearing did not conform to the procedures required by Miller. The Court wrote that
Johnson argues because the district court sentenced her “without adequate
consideration of mitigation arguments based on youth and without a finding that
she was irreparably corrupt,” her sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. As to
the latter part of her argument, that the court erred because it did not specifically
find that Johnson was “irreparably corrupt,” that argument is without merit. Id. at
735 (“Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement . . . .”). Miller
and Montgomery, do, however, require that the sentencing court weighs the
juvenile offender’s youth and characteristics against the nature of the crime to
determine whether the crime was one that “reflected the transient immaturity” of
youth. Id. The requirement to hold such a hearing “gives effect to Miller’s
substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children
whose crimes reflect transient immaturity.” Id.
Here, the trial court held just such a hearing. . . . Although Miller and
Montgomery had not been decided at the time of the sentencing hearing, and
therefore the terms of “irreparably corrupt” and “transient immaturity” where not
in the court’s lexicon at that time, the court clearly considered Johnson’s youth
and all its attendant characteristics and determined, in light of the heinous nature
of the crime, that Johnson, despite her youth, deserved life without parole.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Johnson’s Eighth
Amendment claims under Miller fail.

13

Johnson v. State, — Idaho —, — P.3d —, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 131, *31, 2017 WL 1967808 (Idaho
May 12, 2017). However, the Miller substantive limit on JLWOP sentences is different from the
procedural requirements. “That Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does not
leave States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without
parole. To the contrary, Miller established that this punishment is disproportionate under the
Eighth Amendment.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. at 735. “To be sure, Miller’s
holding has a procedural component,” id., but even faithful compliance with procedure would not
be sufficient to resolve the question of whether Torey’s substantive Eighth Amendment right
against an unwarranted JLWOP sentence has been violated.
It is important to note that this case is on appeal from a summary dismissal of the Eighth
Amendment claim. “On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. A claim for
post-conviction relief may only be summarily dismissed if it does not present a genuine issue of
material fact.” Wheeler v. State, — Idaho —, — P.3d —. 2017 Ida. LEXIS 188, *4, 2017 WL
2666138 (June 21, 2017). As it evaluates the petitioner’s claim as if true, courts must liberally
construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner. “A court is required
to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true . . . .” Wheeler, supra, quoting Baldwin v.
State, 145 Idaho 148, 153, 177 P.3d 362, 367 (2008). Consequently, the district court erred in
not construing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to Torey when it summarily
dismissed the claim.

14

The fact that the court imposed a fixed life sentence after hearing Miller-type evidence is
not evidence that Torey is irreparably corrupt. Prior to Miller/Montgomery, an Idaho Court could
sentence a juvenile to fixed life based solely upon the nature of the offense, irrespective of
whether the juvenile could be rehabilitated. This Court said so in Torey’s direct appeal: “In light
of the excessively heinous nature of the crime committed here . . . [i]t is unnecessary for this
Court to examine Adamcik’s potential for rehabilitation.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 484,
272 P.3d 417, 456, (2012), citing, State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 877, 253 P.3d 310, 314
(2011). No forum – not this Court, the sentencing court, or the post-conviction court – has
addressed the question of whether Torey is one of those rare juveniles who is irreparably corrupt
under Miller/Montgomery. What the sentencing court found in Torey’s case does not even
address – much less answer – the substantive Eighth Amendment question.
Miller/Montgomery grants Torey a right to a procedure where he can show he is not
irreparably corrupt. It was error to summarily dismiss his petition without granting him a hearing
to prove his substantive Eighth Amendment claim. As Montgomery instructs: “There are
instances in which a substantive change in the law must be attended by a procedure that enables a
prisoner to show that he falls within the category of persons whom the law may no longer punish.
For example, . . . when the Constitution prohibits a particular form of punishment for a class of
persons, an affected prisoner receives a procedure through which he can show that he belongs to
the protected class.” 136 S. Ct., at 735. (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted) (citing to
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (requiring a procedure to determine whether a
particular individual with an intellectual disability “fall[s] within the range of [intellectually
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disabled] offenders about whom there is a national consensus” that execution is impermissible).
Torey has never had the opportunity to make this showing.
Torey has already presented a prima facie case that he has the potential for rehabilitation
based solely upon the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing and the Rule 35 motion. In
short summary, Torey had only been sixteen years of age for three months at the time the instant
offense was committed. He had no criminal record. Torey’s friends, family and teachers all
described him as shy, happy, liking children and animals, respectful and never demonstrating a
tendency towards violence. T (8-27-07) pg. 27-28, 32-33, 35-37, 39-42, 44-46, 48-50, 52-54; T
Vol. III, pg. 2931-2935, 2944-2946, 2953, 2987-2989, 2998-2999, 3023-3028, 3032-3033, 30423043, 3045. Torey presented a low risk to re-offend. T Vol. III, pg. 2913, ln. 5-17. Testing of
Torey demonstrated that he had an under-developed moral compass, poor judgment and
impulsivity. T Vol. III, pg. 2913, ln. 18-25. Adolescent brains are not “particularly developed”
and even the average adolescent possesses less than adult abilities in areas including reasoning
and judgment. T Vol. III, pg. 2905, ln. 8-25. Torey had less than age appropriate abilities in
areas including judgment, impulse control and problem solving. Id. at pg. 2904, ln. 20-25; see
also Id. at pg. 2910, ln. 3-6; see also Id. at pg. 2910, ln. 24 (Dr. Corgiat testified that “we have a
brain that isn’t developed”). Dr. Corgiat testified that Torey presented a low risk to re-offend
because the testing “unequivocally” presented no evidence demonstrating a “pathological drive
or pathological desire that he would personally harbor that would have led him to these
offenses.” T Vol. III, pg. 2913, ln. 5-17. Torey’s age combined with his less than age
appropriate development indicate that he is a good candidate for rehabilitation because he would
be more amenable to education and training than an older person or even a person of the same
16

age with age-appropriate development. Id. at pg. 2910, ln. 23 - pg. 2911, ln. 5.9 Additional
evidence of Torey’s good character was presented at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing.
Compare, Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 733, 202 P.3d 642, 655 (2008). (Summary disposition
of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), mental retardation claim affirmed where petitioner
did not offer any expert opinion stating that he was mentally retarded at the time of the murders
or prior to age eighteen.). In addition, Torey testified about his role in the offense at the
evidentiary hearing which contained mitigating evidence about his involvement in the offense
including his remorse for his participation in it and which was not available to the sentencing
court.
Finally, Montgomery notes that evidence of Torey’s post-sentencing behavior would be
relevant “as an example of one kind of evidence that prisoners might use to demonstrate
rehabilitation.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct., at 736. Torey has not had an opportunity
to present that sort of post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence because Montgomery was not
decided until after his post-conviction petition was summarily dismissed.
As Montgomery stated: “Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or
her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at
573). The totality of the evidence before this Court, taken in the light most favorable to Torey,
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Accordingly, the district court’s finding that Torey would kill again if released, T
(8/24/2007) pg. 59, ln. 2-5, is not supported by the evidence and represented an abuse of
discretion. Moreover, it should not even be considered at this point since the facts at summary
disposition must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Wheeler, supra.
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raised a genuine question of material fact whether Torey is not one of those rare juveniles who is
even eligible to receive a JLWOP sentence. The summary dismissal should be vacated and the
matter remanded either for a new sentencing hearing or for an evidentiary hearing. See State v.
Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396 (Az. 2016) (“Healer and Valencia are entitled to evidentiary
hearings on their Rule 32.1(g) petitions because they have made colorable claims for relief based
on Miller. [Citations omitted.] At these hearings, they will have an opportunity to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that their crimes did not reflect irreparable corruption but instead
transient immaturity.”) Summary disposition of the substantive aspect of the Miller claim was
also in error and should be vacated.
III. CONCLUSION
The post-conviction court erred in dismissing parts of the post conviction petition and
then denying Torey’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition should be granted,
the convictions vacated, and the matter remanded for a new trial. Alternatively, a new sentencing
should be ordered or the Miller claim should be set for an evidentiary hearing.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of July, 2017.

/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Torey Adamcik
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